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The ordinary business of macroeconometric modeling: 
working on the Fed-MIT-Penn model (1964-1974) 
 
 
Roger E. Backhouse and Beatrice Cherrier 
 
Abstract (110 words) 
The FMP model exemplifies the Keynesian models later criticized by Lucas, Sargent and 
others as conceptually flawed. For economists in the 1960s such models were “big science”, 
posing organizational as well as theoretical and empirical problems. It was part of an even 
larger industry in which the messiness for which such models were later criticized was 
endorsed as providing enabling modelers to be guided by data and as offering the flexibility 
needed to undertake policy analysis and to analyze the consequences of events. Practices that 
critics considered fatal weaknesses, such as intercept adjustments or fudging, were what 
clients were what clients paid for as the macroeconometric modeling industry went private.  
 
Keywords 
Macroeconometrics, Modigliani, Ando, De Leeuw, Gramlich, Federal Reserve, Lucas 
critique, Modeling. 
 
Acknowledgements 
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at workshops at the University of Lille on 
March 8, 2016, and at the University of Utrecht on April 6, 2017. We are grateful to 
 2 
workshop participants and, in particular, to Juan Acosta, Kevin Hoover and an anonymous 
referee for extremely helpful comments. 
1. Introduction 
The 1970s were a decade of dramatic changes in both macroeconomic performance and 
macroeconomic theory, which makes it easy to forget what had gone before. As early as 
1978, Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent wrote that they had spent time describing the 
“halcyon days of Keynesian economics” because “without conscious effort they are difficult 
to recall today” (Lucas and Sargent, 1978[1981], 295). They described Keynesian economics 
as involving “a simple set of quantitative relationships between fiscal policy and economic 
activity generally.” A key point in their description was that Keynesianism could not be 
understood apart from econometric modeling: 
 
The Keynesian Revolution was, in the form in which it succeeded in the United 
States, a revolution in method. … [I]f one does not view the revolution in this way, it 
is impossible to account for some of its most important features: the evolution of 
macroeconomics into a quantitative, scientific discipline, the development of explicit 
statistical descriptions of economic behavior, the increasing reliance of government 
officials on technical economic expertise, and the introduction of the use of 
mathematical control theory to manage an economy. (Lucas and Sargent 
1978[1981], 296; emphasis in the original). 
 
They concluded that Keynesian macroeconomics had failed because it lacked “a sound 
theoretical or econometric basis” (1978,14),1 criticizing Keynesian models on theoretical 
grounds – for a “failure to derive behavioral relationships from any consistently posed 
 
1 The notion that Keynesian models have “failed” or can be considered a “failure” is repeated 17 times.  
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dynamic optimization problems,” forward-looking expectations and continuous market 
clearing – and pairing that critique with a long rebuttal of the restrictions used by Keynesians 
to achieve identification.  
 
Without wishing to pronounce on what constitutes the correct approach to 
macroeconometric modeling,2 we argue that acceptance of Lucas and Sargent’s arguments 
has obscured the goals and practices of Keynesian macroeconometric modelers, and that 
there is a need for a historical investigation of their epistemological commitments – of what 
they believed constituted a sound and scientific model. We provide such an investigation 
through examining the history of one of the main macroeconometric models, the so-called 
FMP  model, named after its three main institutional supports, the Federal Reserve Board, the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of Pennsylvania.3 Between 1966 
and 1970, this model was jointly developed by a team of academic macroeconomists led by 
Franco Modigliani (MIT) and Albert Ando (Penn), and the staff of the Division of Research 
and Statistics (DRS) of the Federal Reserve Board, led by Frank DeLeeuw and Edward 
Gramlich. The resulting multi-equation model was explicitly designed to “say more than 
existing models about the effects of monetary policy instruments” (De Leeuw and Gramlich 
1968, 11). When the original team stopped working on it, the model was transferred to 
Wharton Associates for maintenance. We claim that, at least during the first decade of its life 
the FMP model played an important role in the evolution of macroeconomics and exhibited 
many features common to most large-scale models of the period.  
Our history of the model substantiates Lucas and Sargent’s claim that macroeconometric 
modeling was an integral part of the history of macroeconomics. However, it argues that 
 
2 For a recent debate over this, see the symposium in the Oxford Review of Economic Policy 34(1-2), 2018. 
Some participants, including Olivier Blanchard and Simon Wren-Lewis, argue for approaches that have much in 
common with the approach we are describing here. 
3 It has also been called the MPS model (where the S denotes the Social Science Research Council) and other 
names. See Rancan (2018). 
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Keynesian modelers had epistemic commitments very different from those of Lucas and 
Sargent. A major reason why Keynesian economics cannot be understood apart from 
macroeconometric modeling is that there was no linear relationship running from economic 
theory to empirical models of specific economies: theory and application developed together. 
The process of macroeconomic modeling was, as Lucas and Sargent alleged, a mess in the 
sense that the models did not follow rigorously from a consistent theory, estimated using 
formal procedures that remained stable over time. However, this was not because the creators 
of the FMP model did not understand what they were doing: it was because they had different 
goals and criteria. There is indeed a danger that historians let the definition of a satisfactory 
macroeconomic model provided by Lucas, Sargent or some other “influential” economist, 
frame objects we are studying. Doing this allows the history of macroeconomics to be written 
as a succession of well-identifiable models with consistent theoretical foundations and clearly 
defined estimation strategies. However, history is messy in that boundaries are often blurred 
and, until we understand economists’ motivations, the procedures followed can seem casual, 
inconsistent and ever-changing. 
How models mediate between the world and economists, and how they and facts travel, 
being transformed in the process have received substantial attention from historians (see 
Morgan 2012, Boumans 2015). Our account of the FMP model augments this literature by 
providing a window into what happen when a model “in the making” is being built and used 
by several protagonists with different, sometimes antagonistic purposes, tools and values: 
academic economists, policy makers and businessmen.  
Our account shows that it is not even clear that it is possible to speak about “the FMP 
model.” Instead there was collection of equations whose scope and contours could be adapted 
to the purpose of model building, and a set of tools (computers and software) and 
administrative procedures for achieving this efficiently. The problem here, therefore, is not 
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merely to uncover the compromises reflected in the model, but to track a constantly changing 
object better described as a collection of models. We therefore examine the different reasons 
our protagonists had to participate in the FMP project, how these different goals translated 
into varied simulation practices, tradeoffs between theoretical consistency and forecasting 
performance, and housekeeping procedures. In other words, we trace the consequences of 
moving from Keynesian economic science as it existed in the 1950s to the 
macroeconometrics industry that had developed by the 1970s. 
 This paper claims that Keynesian economists were aware of both the constant 
interplay of theoretical and empirical practices that characterized macroeconometrics 
and the resulting “messiness” of the model. More than this, they endorsed it. 
Responding to Lucas and Sargent, Ando (1981, 346), spelled out three characteristics of 
a “sound theoretical and econometric basis” for a model: “(1) all behavioral and other 
assumptions for deriving the equation to be estimated must be explicitly spelled out. (2) 
All available evidence from whatever the source, formal or informal, should be 
marshalled to check the goodness of approximation of all hypotheses at all levels,” and 
(3) that aggregate hypotheses should be checked again micro data.  However, he 
immediately went on to explain why “it is so difficult to follow this simple principle in 
building and improving macroeconometric models.” There was a problem with 
economic theory in that theoretical propositions typically refer to equilibrium states, 
whereas the real economy is a complex dynamic system which needs to be simplified in 
order to be analyzed. The need to simplify—to reduce a complex system to a few simple 
equations—requires “very complex and strong assumptions” (Ando 1981, p. 347). The 
whole model cannot be tested against time series data alone and, because it was 
necessary to use different types of evidence, and because there was no statistical theory 
that could be used to judge whether approximations were adequate, the task of checking 
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and improving approximations had to be undertaken “informally and implicitly” (Ando 
1981, 355).  
 These informal processes led to the apparent messiness of macroeconometric 
modeling, but those involved did not perceive this as a failure: it was, rather, messiness 
by design. In short, not only did Keynesian and New Classical economists have 
theoretical and empirical disagreements—they also disagreed on which sets of practices 
would produce a model of “value in guiding policy” (Lucas and Sargent 1978, 2). 4   
 
2. A common model for many purposes 
Modigliani has claimed that the FMP model was commissioned in 1964 by the Board of 
Governors, who channeled money through the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) so 
that the model be developed in universities, thereby reflecting independent judgments about 
the structure of the economy (Modigliani 2001, 100). His recollections are, however, not 
entirely consistent with those of the other researchers involved.5 Several economists of in the 
DRS, including Daniel Brill and Frank de Leeuw, had already been involved in the 
development of a macroeconometric model under the sponsorship of the SSRC, which 
became known as the Brookings model (Acosta and Pinzon-Fuchs 2018). De Leuuw had 
been in charge of writing up the financial sector, producing a nineteen-equation model which 
included several policy instruments and transmission channels, from cost-of-capital and 
wealth effects to credit rationing (see Acosta and Rubin 2018). The Board had declined to 
support the project financially, in spite of the DRS directors’ attempts to advertise the 
 
4 Ando argued that the methods proposed by Lucas and Christopher Sims did not avoid the problems that they 
said plagued Keynesian macroeconometrics, but involved making arbitrary assumptions that could not be 
directly verified (see, for example, Ando 1981, 355-6). 
5 This paragraph builds on Acosta and Cherrier (2018), who provide a more exhaustive account of how 
macroeconometrics came to the Federal Reserve Bank. See Rancan (2018) for a different perspective.  
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“potentialities of econometric methods of projecting the economy’s future performance” 
(Acosta and Cherrier 2018, 18). 
By 1965, Brill, who had by then become DRS director, was making plans for “a 
comprehensive research project in linkages between monetary policy and the general 
economy…from Federal reserve actions to spending decisions…among money market 
variables…and more basic financial variables, such as between bank reserves and the money 
supply” (Acosta and Cherrier 2018, 19). One reason for developing such model was that the 
Board had come under intense attacks from Congressmen (notably Wright Patman), some 
businessmen, and economists ranging from Council of Economic Advisers member James 
Tobin to monetarists Karl Brunner and Alan Meltzer.6 Despite their different views on 
monetary theory and what constituted sound monetary policy, they agreed that the Board’s 
decision-making process was “rel[ying] more on a general faith that virtue pays than on 
careful empirical and theoretical analysis” (Tobin 1961, 26). The Board thus needed a model 
that could help them produce the forecasts they were just beginning to use for the meeting of 
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and that could show the channels whereby 
acting on discount rates, borrowed and unborrowed reserves and other policy instruments 
would affect the economy. Their project was intended as a device for both forecasting and 
empirical policy analysis.  
 Building a model that would allow an empirical study of the “complex interaction of 
forces through which monetary and fiscal policies affect the entire economy,” as Ando would 
later put it to the Board, was also appealing to academic Keynesian economists.7 But their 
motive was different: they wanted to settle a theoretical controversy. As Gramlich told the 
National Association of Business Economists in 1969, “[Modigliani and Ando] were spurred 
on in an attempt to resolve their inconclusive interchange with Friedman-Meiselman in the 
 
6 Brunner and Meltzer wrote a report for Patman’s Commission on Money and Credit in 1964. 
7 Ando, “Introduction,” undated but probably 1968, Box RW15 folder ‘notebook,” FMP. 
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1965 American Economic Review.”8 The background to this was the attempt by Milton 
Friedman, Anna Schwartz and other collaborators to rehabilitate the quantity theory of 
money, developing the body of thought that Brunner was shortly to call monetarism.9 As part 
of this research, Friedman and David Meiselman (1963) produced evidence that the 
correlation between money and output was higher and more stable than the Keynesian 
multiplier, implying, so they claimed, that this supported the quantity theory.10 Ando and 
Modigliani (1965) responded by arguing that Friedman and Meiselman had failed to specify 
correctly the variables involved. The ensuing debate, which took a hundred pages of the 
December 1965 issue of the American Economic Review, centered on estimating two-variable 
reduced-form equations. Even out-of-sample tests failed to show that one formulation was 
best, leading to the conclusion that such models could never resolve a theoretical controversy 
(see Brainard and Cooper 1975, 170; Blaug 1980, 216-17). To do that it was necessary to turn 
to more detailed structural models, which explains the interest of Ando and Modigliani in 
building a large-scale, structural macroeconometric model. 
 As Ando explained shortly afterwards, around 1966 “it was agreed that the two efforts 
be merged to construct a single econometric model.”11 Between the Fall of 1966 and the end 
of 1967, the team specified the theoretical structure of the behavioral equations, made 
preliminary estimates of the parameters and ran trial simulations of the model. There was a 
continual interaction between theoretical and empirical work. The builders of the FMP model 
 
8 Gramlich, “Complicated and simple approaches to Estimating the role of money on econonomic activity,” 
06/05/1969, Box 1, Gramlich papers. See Rancan (2018) for a detailed account of the monetarist vs Keynesian 
battle and how it fed into a model war which opposed the Board’s FMP and the Federal Bank of St Louis’s 
Anderson-Jordan equation.  
9 Brunner is usually credited with coining the term “monetarism”, but it was already well established in the 
literature on Latin America. For example, Seers (1963) used the term to denote an alternative to structuralist 
policies. 
10 Much of Friedman’s work involved establishing correlations and lag lengths, for which Keynesians criticized 
him on the grounds that correlation and timing did not imply causation. 
11 Ando, 1968, Introduction, ibid. The reasons for this decision are unclear. We speculate that Ando and 
Modigliani might have recognized that the Fed economists had more expertise in the monetary transmission 
mechanisms, while they had a more refined theory of how financial variables affect the real economy. It might 
also be that the Fed economists had better access to monetary and financial data needed to estimate the model.  
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drew on pre-existing economic theory but the process of modeling prompted the development 
of new theories. For example, Dwight Jaffee and Modigliani (1969) developed a theory of 
credit rationing, Jaffee also doing extensive research, some of which was with other 
economists involved in the FMP model, on mortgage markets and housing (see Jaffee 1971, 
Jaffee and Gramlich, 1973). Rasche (1972) developed a theory about how the performance of 
the stock market affected consumption, and Modigliani and Robert Shiller (1973) extended 
the theory of the term structure of interest rates to include expectations of inflation. Ando, 
Modigliani, Rasche and Stephen Turnovsky (1974), also responding to recent concern with 
expectations of inflation, developed a theory of how interest affected investment decisions 
(failure to forecast investment accurately was identified as one of the main problems with the 
model).  
The project thus generated a stream of papers investigating, inter alia, various aspects 
of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, including the effects of interest rates on 
housing and plants investment and durable goods consumption, the consequences of credit 
rationing, and the effects of expectations of future changes in asset prices on the term 
structure and on the structure of banks’ and households’ portfolios, and Tobin’s q. It was also 
necessary to write software both to do the necessary estimation and to run the simulations.12  
This makes it clear that, even in the first year of its operation, the “FMP model” in fact hosted 
a multiplicity of models and theoretical viewpoints that were difficult to reconcile, a variety 
of simulation practices, and diverging ideas of what the model was for and how scientific 
integrity and forecasting performance should be weighed against another. Macroeconometric 
modeling was already becoming a messy business.  
 
 
 
 
12 Modigliani Papers, Box CO1(Ando-FRB), untitled, undated statement about end of project 
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3. Theoretical consistency to messy practice  
3.1 A collection of models in constant evolution 
During this early period, separate variants of the model were maintained by the academics at 
MIT and Penn, and by the Fed. It was not until 1969 that these two variants of the model 
were merged. Even with the software they had developed, merging the models and re-
estimating the equations could take two to three months. They reported that, it was not until 
early 1970 that “for the first time we had something that could be called the FRB-MIT-Penn 
model.”13 The first phase of the model’s life formally concluded at the end of 1970, when the 
contract between the Federal Reserve and the SSRC was terminated. Modigliani and Ando 
had taken on the task of providing a written description of the model and arrangements were 
made for Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates (WEFA) to maintain and distribute 
it.14 
 There were several reasons why two sets of models were maintained in the early 
years. One reason was that whilst the MIT-Penn version of the model would be public, the 
Fed wished to keep modifications to its version of the model confidential. Brill wrote to 
Modigliani,  
One matter about which I have some concern would be the description of any 
simulation results of the joint model you might want to publish when our joint effort 
has been completed. … Obviously it would have to be made clear that these results did 
not necessarily reflect the views of the Board or the staff. Clearly, we cannot—and 
would not—try to limit your use of the model in any way. Nonetheless, I can foresee 
 
13 Final Report. Modigliani (2001) remembered the model having been completed in 1969. 
14 WEFA was a non-profit organization established in 1969 by the University of Pennsylvania to handle the 
many activities associated with the Wharton macroeconometric model. 
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the possibility of distinct embarrassment to the System from widespread publicity given 
to strange results of early simulation runs of an untested model.15  
Another reason was their different time perspectives. The academic economists wanted a 
model to adjudicate a long-term controversy but the Fed economists wanted forecasts as soon 
as possible. Ando acknowledged this in a letter to Brill: “Those of us from the academic side 
were inclined to postpone the work involved in putting together the model and concentrate on 
improvements of each equation, but Frank DeLeeuw and Ned Gramlich felt, quite properly, 
that they must have a functioning system as soon as possible.”16 
 There was effectively an even wider variety of models in that the Fed economists 
were running many kinds of simulation, each answering a different type of question. 
“Diagnostic simulations” were aimed at understanding the characteristics of the model: whole 
blocks were taken as exogenous, so as to pin down causes and effects in the rest of the 
system. Software was developed to make it easy to isolate a variable and to substitute its 
observed values for those predicted by the equations.17 “Dynamic simulations” involved 
feeding into the model forecasts from the previous period into the model for up to 38 
quarters, and checking whether the model blew up (it often did) or remained stable and 
yielded credible estimates for GDP or unemployment (Gramlich 2004). “Stochastic 
simulations” were carried out by specifying initial conditions, then making out-of-sample 
forecasts. Policy simulations involved using the multipliers implied by a calibrated version of 
the model to examine the effects of changes in policy instruments (Gramlich 1997, p. 24). To 
run these many simulations, the Fed version of the model was ready by November, 1967, 
while the Penn-MIT version of the model only became operational in the summer of 1968.  
 
 
15 Brill to Modigliani, July 6, 1966. Box 151, folder 1725, SSRC2, cited in Acosta and Cherrier (2018) 
16 Ando to Brill, 01/10/1969, “Memorandum on administration, Project manager and disbursement of materials, 
econometric model project,” box RW15 folder “notebook,” Modigliani papers 
17 Ando to Modigliani, December 8, 1967, p. 2. Modigliani Papers Box CO1 (Ando). 
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The FMP modelers also realized that, not only did they have to work with several models, 
but each of them was constantly evolving over time. Initially their view was that they would 
estimate a specific model—one set of equations—and that this model would then be used for 
forecasting and policy analysis. However, as they built the model they discovered from their 
own experience something that other modelers had known—that modeling was an ongoing 
process, for there were always further modifications to make.18 In the final report it was made 
clear that a major part of the model was set of procedures that had been established to 
manage it. In the period when there were two variants of the model, “housekeeping 
procedures” had to be devised so as to incorporate the best of both models. The completion of 
the model involved not just a complete set of equations but the development of “a means of 
rapidly revising and re-estimating it.” A report on maintenance of the model stated that “it is 
expected of any econometric model that, as time passes and new data accumulate, some 
equations in the model begin to drift. In some cases, this is because of the changes in 
institutional arrangements, in others, it is because of the subtle shifts in the empirical 
definitions of variables, and in still others, due to unsatisfactory specifications of the theory 
underlying the specific equation.”19 The model was something that needed to be managed, 
with some watching over its performance over the years, a task that Rasche was willing to 
undertake. The model had become something that evolved. 
3.2 Different tradeoffs between theoretical consistency and forecasting performance 
Yet another reason for maintaining several versions of the model was different approaches to 
theoretical specification. The Fed economists seemed more concerned with institutional 
details, as attested by the many monetary control variables in De Leeuw’s equations: non-
 
18 For example, by the end of the century, the Bank of England had concluded that “economic models should 
not be thought of as fixed in form or content, and that model development is a continual process” (Bank of 
England 2000, p. 365). 
19 Ando to Hickman, Undated memorandum, “Maintenance of MPS model”, Modigliani Papers, Box CO1 
(FRB).  
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borrowed reserves, reserve ratios against demand and time deposits, the discount rate and 
ceiling rates on bank time deposits. His theory was informed by a close knowledge of Fed 
operations. Modigliani and Ando adopted a different approach in which the integrity of key 
theoretical insights had to be preserved. Acosta and Rubin (2018) explain that the number of 
policy variables in DeLeeuw’s equations was subsequently drastically reduced to a decision 
concerning free reserves. The need for competing theoretical specifications within the same 
macroeconomic modeling project was well understood and accepted. Ando wrote, “None of 
us holds the view that there should be only one model. It would indeed be unhealthy if there 
were no honest differences among us as to what are the best specifications of some of the 
sectors of the model, and when such differences do exist, we should maintain alternative 
formulation until such time as performances of two formulations can be thoroughly 
compared.”20  
The flexibility with which the theoretical structure was handled when it did not perform 
well during simulation shines through Ando and Modigliani’s correspondence. To understand 
how messiness was embedded in the design of the model, it is worth quoting one of their 
exchanges at length. After a series of simulations which had not blown up in the Fall of 1967, 
Ando wrote:  
This does not mean that we do not have some major problems to work on beginning 
in January. First of all, the rent equation seems to be completely unsatisfactory, and 
we had to leave it out for our simulation. I think the consumer durables equation must 
be improved substantially. Of course, there are sectors which we have left out: labor 
market and wages and prices, and the mortgage market. On the labor market, it may 
be that manhours equation and the hours per man equation which Richard [Sutch] has 
given us, together with the participation equation that we put together last summer, 
 
20 Ando to Modigliani, December 8, 1967, p. 2. Modigliani Papers Box CO1 (Ando). 
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will be satisfactory, but we have not tried yet. That is the next step in our simulation 
experiments. On wages, [Alfred] Tella tried to carry on where I left off last summer, 
and ran into all sorts of trouble. I still think that if we worked sufficiently hard, 
something can be salvaged, but it must be worked on further. On the general price 
level, you must have got the equation that [Richard] Sutch reluctantly gave us, and as 
he says himself, it is not a satisfactory equation. Of course, there is the question of 
relative prices, which we have not touched…. 
On the question of the mortgage market, I went down to Washington this 
Tuesday….and talked it over with [Gordon] Sparks and Frank [de Leeuw]. Sparks 
now has the demand equation for mortgages, and a set of equations for the supply of 
mortgages by savings institutions. They look at least promising, and we can use them 
as a starting point. On the other hand, he still does not have a completely satisfactory 
equation for housing starts, so the housing sector will have to be worked on quite a bit 
…. [Harold] Shapiro has done no work whatsoever on the consumption sector, so that 
too will have to be taken over by us. This sounds rather formidable, but I don’t think 
the task will be impossible…21 
 
How the equations were handled reflected economists’ tradeoffs between analytical 
consistency and forecasting performance. Such tradeoffs were inevitable because predictive 
success required modifications that had either had no theoretical justification or even ran 
counter to economic theory. This can be illustrated by discussions over the consumption 
sector of the model. Remarks made by De Leeuw in March 1968, when he wrote that 
dynamic simulations were improved if current income was dropped from the consumption 
equation illustrate how the equations had to be modified in order to reduce simulation errors: 
“We get a considerable reduction in dynamic simulation errors if we change the total 
 
21 Ando to Modigliani, December 8, 1967, pp. 1-2. Modigliani Papers Box CO1 (Ando). 
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consumption equation by reducing the current income weight and increasing the lagged 
income weight […] We get a slight further reduction of simulation error if we change the 
consumption allocation equations so as to reduce the importance of current income and 
increase the importance of total consumption,” he explained, explaining that the consequence 
of the revision would be that “the multipliers will build up more gradually than in our 
previous policy simulations, and also that the government expenditure multiplier will exceed 
the tax multiplier.”22 
The exchange with Modigliani also shows that Fed and academic economists were 
willing to make different kinds of trade-off between theoretical consistency and predictive 
power. Modigliani, who needed to solve a theoretical debate, objected to DeLeeuw’s 
treatment of consumption, writing “I am surprised to find that in these equations you have 
dropped completely current income. Originally this variable had been introduced to account 
for investment of transient income in durables. This still seems a reasonable hypothesis.”23 
As explained by Acosta and Cherrier (2018), the practice at the DRS was to further blend the 
“mechanical forecasts” produced by the model with “judgments” provided by those in-house 
“business economists” who understood and anticipated the “feel and tone” of several sectors 
of the economy. Chairman Martin remained extremely skeptical toward macroeconometric 
modeling, so that theoretical consistency had no appeal whatsoever to the Board.  
Diverging goals therefore nurtured conflicting model adjustments, even though it is 
unclear how much FMP was used as a policy aid in the end. By the time the model was in full 
operation, Arthur Burns had replaced Martin as chairman. Though a highly skilled economist 
and former Chair of the CEA, he proved as skeptical toward macroeconometric models as his 
predecessor, and his decisions were largely driven by political pressures (Ferrell 2010). 
Several economists recall that the Bluebook, the document produced to inform discussion at 
 
22 De Leeuw to Ando, March 6, 1968. Modigliani Papers, Box CO1 (FRB). 
23 Modigliani to de Leeuw, March 15, 1968. Modigliani Papers, Box CO1 (FRB). 
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meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) and intended to present 3 
alternative monetary scenarios, was closely overseen by Burns. The staff was, according to 
former Fed staff member Arnold Kling (undated, 26), not free to come up with whatever 
forecast it thought most probable. Board member Sherman Maisel, DRS econometrician 
James Pierce and DRS advisor Peter Keir all stated that Burns would ask that option B, the 
middle-range one FOMC members were supposed to converge toward, be a write-up of his 
preferred policy rather than a reflection of independent forecasts (Acosta and Cherrier 2018). 
Such an approach was justifiable given that even supporters of the model recognized its 
limitations. For example, Lyle Gramley, a senior economist at the Fed who later became a 
Governor, supported the model but would not trust it as a forecasting device.24  Ando 
admitted to the SSRC that he was not optimistic about the short-run forecasting ability of the 
model, and Gramlich was also confessed that “our model has left something to be desired on 
this score [forecasting].”25  Behind diverging practices and trade-offs there were different 
conceptions of what counted as “science,” and of what kind of science was most useful for 
forecasting and policy purpose. The disagreement with other groups of economists, in 
particular monetarists and New classical were even larger.  
4. From Keynesian Science to macroeconometric industry 
4.1 Macroeconometric modeling as “big science” 
 
By the standards of MIT, which achieved its post-war eminence in large part through 
being the site of massive natural science and engineering laboratories, building the FMP 
model was a small project, but from the perspective of economics in the 1960s, it was “big 
 
24 Modigliani Papers, CO1(FRB), Gramley to Ando, April 29, 1968 shows his support for the model; Gramlich 
2004 documents Gramley’s scepticism about its forecasts. 
25 Modigliani Papers, CO15(Model), Report on the meetings of the SSRC Subcommittee on monetary 
mechanism on May 1-2, 1969, p. Gramlich, “Recent experience with the FRB-MIT model,” Presented to the 
committee on Banking and Credit Policy? New York, 11/06/1969, Gramlich papers. 
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science.” Given the computing technology of the day and the need to draw on a wide range of 
expertise, such models had to be created by teams of researchers, and it posed bureaucratic as 
well as technical challenges. The construction of the model involved not simply Ando, 
Modigliani, De Leeuw and Gramlich themselves, but a large team of economists, including 
many MIT graduate students: Larry Meyer was in charge of the housing sector (modeling 
how equity and housing values are affected by monetary policy). As was mentioned earlier, 
Jaffee worked with Modigliani on the effect of credit-rationing on housing, de Menil handled 
the wage equation, with a focus on the effect of unions on wages, while Charles Bischoff 
provided a model of plant and equipment investment, and Sparks wrote the demand equation 
for mortgages. Ando concentrated on estimates of fiscal multipliers whilst Modigliani 
researched how money influenced wages and links between expectations and interest rates 
with students Sutch and Schiller. At the Fed, Enid Miller, Helen Popkin, Tella and Peter 
Tinsley, worked on the banking financial sector and transmission mechanisms, in particular 
portfolio adjustment. Responsibilities for data compilation, coding, running simulations were 
also shared between academics and the Fed, with Rasche playing a key role. By the standards 
of much economic research of the day, therefore, this was “big science.” 
Initially, a major reason for revision of the model was the process whereby it was 
constructed. It seems that graduate students picked a topic, then worked in relative isolation 
for months, gathering their own data, surveying the literature on the behavior of banks, firms, 
unions consumers or investors before sending back a block of equations. Because these 
blocks each had different structure, characteristics and properties, various methods were used 
to estimate them. Even if each block was a good fit to the data on which it was estimated, 
there could be no assurance that it would produce sensible results when combined with other 
blocks estimated on different data, something that could be ascertained only through 
simulations. Later on, changes in the economic environment, notably significant increases in 
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the inflation rate, necessitated reworking many sectors of the model, and so a new batch of 
researchers in various universities reworked the housing, consumption, financial and 
investment blocks in 1969-1973.  
As has been already been documented (Hoover 2012), Keynesian macroeconomists did 
not ignore the need for microfoundations, but problems such as these meant that ensuring 
consistency was a major headache. There was no assurance that the separate parts of the 
model would fit together, despite Modigliani and Ando being in overall charge of the project. 
When a dynamic simulation was conducted looking 8 years (32 quarters) ahead and the 
model did not explode, keeping reasonably close to the observed data, this was considered a 
major achievement.26 This problem was not, of course, confined to the FMP model. For 
example, a report from 1969 on the Brookings model notes that “When the original large-
scale system was first planned and constructed, there was no assurance that the separate parts 
would fit together in a consistent whole” (McCarthy 1992). Consistency involved more than 
standardization of the theory and econometric procedures used but extended to the 
“housekeeping procedures” that enabled the modelers to keep track of alternative equations 
and how they worked together, and to quickly revise and re-estimate the model. These 
included building large database capabilities with easy access and update procedures, 
common packages, such as AUTO-ECON or TROLL, the residual-check procedure aimed at 
automatizing code-accuracy checks (McCarthy 1992).  
A further problem was that computational capabilities and simulation procedures were, by 
modern standards, undeveloped, though it is not clear how far this shaped the models and 
their results. 1960s reports are filled with computer breakdowns and coding nightmares. For 
example, in 1967, Ando lamented, “the reason for the long delay is […] that the University of 
Pennsylvania computer facilities have completely broken down since the middle of October 
 
26 Ando to Modigliani, December 8, 1967, p. 1. Modigliani Papers Box CO1 (Ando). 
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during the process of conversion to a [IBM] 360 system, and until four days ago, we had to 
commute to Brookings in Washington to get any work done.”27 The complexity of the task of 
performing the simulations was no doubt a source of frustration, yet these computational 
constraints could have stimulated the creativity of the economists working on the model. The 
creative solutions had to become “material,” for instance by being embedded in software. 
One example is the 1967 simulation package (SIM) developed by Morris Norman for 
econometric model simulation which allowed modelers to solve a system of equations 
through Gauss-Seidel iteration faster than through block procedure (McCarthy 1992, 398).  
 
The FMP model was not just “big science” but was part of a wider “industry” of 
macroeconometric modeling, for it was one of many models created at this time. This was 
significant because different models were not developed in isolation from each other. There 
were frequent consultations between modelers, in part because of Klein’s presence at the 
University of Pennsylvania and because of the role of the Social Science Research Council in 
funding several models. When the SSRC and NBER planned a conference to analyze the 
performance of different models, Klein urged Ando to participate on the grounds that 
otherwise all the models [OBE, Wharton and Brookings] would be “products of his work, 
one way or another.”28 Not that the FRB model was completely independent: it has been 
claimed that it “grew out of the Brookings project” and that material on the public sector was 
taken from the Wharton model (Bodkin, Klein and Marwah 1991, p. 108). As the model was 
developed, Ando discussed it with Klein.29 The scheme developed by Norman and Raasche 
for processing data and managing the FMP model was “adopted almost bodily” by those 
operating the Wharton and Brookings models, and the eventual ongoing maintenance of the 
model by Wharton, which had its own model, illustrates how close different models could 
 
27 Ando to Modigliani, November 22, 1967, p. 1. Modigliani Papers Box CO1 (Ando). 
28 Modigliani Papers, CO1(Ando-FRB), Ando to Modigliani December 8, 1967. 
29 Modigliani Papers, CO1(Ando-FRB), Ando to Modigliani November 22, 1967. 
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be.30  Such practices were a long way from the vision of scholars working in isolation except 
in so far as they read and responded to newly published material and engaged in common-
room discussions with colleagues in the same institution.  The scale of this industry and the 
extent to which it overlapped with macroeconomics more generally make it an important part 
of the history of macroeconomics. 
All in all, the model was simply too complicated for any analytical solution to be 
possible. The model as a whole was therefore, like all comparable models, a mess in that the 
interaction of different sectors might produce behavior that was clearly ridiculous. It 
therefore had to be calibrated in ways that had no clear connection with the underlying 
economic theory. For example, intercept adjustments were commonly used. Such adjustments 
could be taken so far that it was possible for a model to be “transformed so many times since 
its inception that it [became] a model almost devoid of theory, with equations altered and 
dummy variables added wherever necessary to maximize the model's ability to produce a 
control solution that accurately tracks GNP during the sample period” (Gordon 1972, p. 
298).31 This was a description of the Brookings model, where the process had gone further 
than with the FMP model, but the apparent messiness of both models arose, at least in part, 
from the challenges posed by building such a large model given the available economic 
theory and the available computing technology and was made worse by the different goals 
motivating the projects. 
 
4.2 Rejecting or endorsing messiness  
 
This messiness was identified and challenged by opponents. Brunner (1973, 929-931) 
considered the fundamental problem to be a confusion of what he called “pragmatic” and 
 
30 Modigliani Papers, CO1, Ando and Modigliani, Report to the Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, 
on the Econometric Model Project, September 25, 1970, p. 7. 
31 Unlike Lucas, Gordon (1972, 298) believed that the Brookings model was devoid of theory but contrasted it 
with “the MIT-FRB and Wharton Models, which are both supported by a considerable body of theoretical and 
econometric literature.” 
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“cognitive” claims. So much “pragmatic numerology” was needed to get the models to fit the 
data that being able to produce good forecasts (the pragmatic claim) did not constitute 
evidence for the theories on which the models were based or for their policy analysis (the 
cognitive claim). In his view, then, the model could not settle the disagreement with 
Friedman and Meiselman over monetary policy. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, with 
which Brunner and Meltzer were eventually affiliated, had developed a much smaller model 
inspired by monetarist ideas (see Rancan 2018), and agreeing on what constituted a 
convincing empirical test proved difficult. The objective was to ascertain whether changes in 
short-term market interest rates were independent of changes in the stock of interest-bearing 
government debt held by the public, Modigliani having claimed that they were, and Brunner 
and Meltzer that they were not. Presumably intending to avoid the inconclusive results of 
earlier tests of Keynesian and monetarist theories, Meltzer proposed a series of tests and how 
the key variable, government debt, would be defined.32 Replying for Modigliani, who was 
then on his way to Italy, Rasche agreed to three of the four tests, and made suggestions about 
who should compile some of the necessary data. It is not clear whether the tests were actually 
carried out.33  
The exchanges between Brunner and Meltzer, and the MPS team were not on the kind of 
statistical test that should be conducted and on the data that should be used. They concerned 
the precise kind of prediction a “good” model was supposed to yield and on what tests it was 
possible to carry out. For instance, The St Louis economists proposed that their models 
should be able to “predict the changes in short-term market interest rates from the 1st quarter 
1962 through 4th quarter 1966, using the regression equation for your hypothesis and data 
through the 4th quarter of 1961.”34 The FMP team rejected one of Meltzer’s proposed tests on 
 
32 Meltzer to Modigliani, 17 July 1967, Modigliani Papers, Box CO1 (Ando-FRB). 
33 Rasche to Meltzer, September 7, 1967, Modigliani Papers, Box CO1 (Ando-FRB). 
34 Meltzer to Modigliani, 17 July 1967, Modigliani Papers, Box CO1 (Ando-FRB). 
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the ground that the Federal Reserve did not have some of the data. However, it was seen as a 
hindrance that there was no agreed statistical test to compare alternative model specifications.  
The FMP model was constantly compared with models developed by the Brookings 
Institution, the Wharton School, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and other 
organizations, and public comparisons were carried through conferences and volumes 
sponsored by the NBER (Hickman, 1972; Fromm and Klein, 1976). This led the FMP team 
to establish a partnership with statisticians. “We must develop a more systematic procedure 
for choosing among the alternative specifications of the model than the ones that we have at 
our disposal. Arnold Zellner of the University of Chicago has been working on this problem 
with us, and Phoebus Dhrymes and I have just obtained a National Science Foundation grant 
to work on this problem,” Ando wrote in 1968.35 Zellner was already employed as a 
consultant statistician and was assisting with the conduct of simulations. 
One of the practices criticized by Lucas (1976), in his influential critique of econometric 
modeling, was “intercept adjustments,” sometimes known as “fudging” or “add factors” (Fair 
1986). If a model produced apparently systematic errors (if, for example, there was a run of 
positive residuals) this could be corrected by revising the intercept in the corresponding 
equation downwards by an equivalent amount, improving the accuracy of the next forecast. 
Such adjustments became increasingly necessary after the structural changes and inflationary 
pressure that followed the 1973 oil crisis, when models systematically under-predicted 
inflation, leading economists such as Lucas to conclude that they had irretrievably broken 
down. He pointed out that such methods produced better forecasts, but any improvement 
reflected the judgment of the forecasters—it did not validate the models: “the unquestioned 
success of the forecasters should not be construed as evidence for the soundness or reliability 
 
35 “Excerpts from Report from Albert Ando”, 16 September 1968. Modigliani Papers, Box CO1 (FMP). 
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of the structure proposed in that theory” (Lucas 1976, 23, emphasis in original).36 The fact 
that a model was producing systematic errors that needed to be corrected by intercept 
adjustments meant that it must be misconceived. Lucas elaborated on this point using the 
examples of consumption and investment expenditure and the Phillips curve. The need for 
intercept adjustments and other modifications to estimated equations could arise from failing 
to model expectations as rational. Though Lucas confined his examples to single-equation 
models, his arguments would clearly apply, a fortiori, to large-scale models: he described 
“the adaptations necessary for simultaneous equations” as being “too well known to require 
comment” (Lucas 1976, p. 26) 
However, “fudging,” the practice Lucas condemned so harshly, became a major reason 
why businessmen and other clients would pay to access the forecasts provided by the FMP 
and other macroeconometric models. Ray Fair later noted that analyses of the Wharton and 
Office of Business Economics (OBE)37 models showed that ex-ante forecasts from model 
builders (with fudge or add factors) were more accurate than the ex-post forecasts of the 
models (with actual data): that “the use of actual rather than guessed values of the exogenous 
variables decreased the accuracy of the forecasts” (Fair 1986, 1985-6). In the late sixties and 
early seventies, several forecasting companies were created to host major macroeconometric 
models: while Wharton WEFA was a non-profit, Data Resources International (DRI), 
established by Harvard economist Otto Eckstein, and Chase Econometrics, established by 
Klein’s colleague Michael Evans quickly became profitable.38 According to Kling, and 
consistent with Fair’s conclusion, cited above, the hundreds of fudge factors added to large-
 
36 Further evidence was that the process of re-fitting equations did not seem to be converging on more precise 
parameter estimates. 
37 The OBE was in the US Department of Commerce; in 1972 it was reorganized into the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
38 An unsigned article from Time magazine, dated Monday, Jun 25, 1979, titled “Business: Flash and a Touch of 
Brash,” reports that Chase was by then a “$100 million-a-year business.” That same year, the Harvard student 
newspaper, The Crimson reported that DRI was sold to McGraw-Hill for over $100 million 
(https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1979/7/17/mcgraw-hill-inc-plans-to-buy/).  
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scale models were precisely what clients were paying for when buying forecasts from these 
companies. These forecasts were “providing us with the judgment of [Otto] Eckstein, 
[Michael] Evans and Adams as embedded in the add factors, and these judgments are more 
important to most of their customers than are the models themselves” (Kling, undated, 26).39 
What Lucas perceived as bad science was hailed by the models’ customer as a sign of 
flexibility and a guarantee that the model would take into account recent business climate 
shifts. Different communities of economists had different attitudes toward theoretical 
consistency. 
4. Conclusion  
For many economists, Lucas’s critique was decisive. It became widely believed that, 
because people could learn from their mistakes, economists should adopt the theory of 
rational expectations, and that alternative methods of forecasting and policy analysis needed 
to be developed. In the 1980s and 1990s, therefore, a wide range of new modeling strategies 
were pursued, from atheoretical time-series analysis to the development of DSGE (dynamic, 
stochastic general equilibrium) models, many of them immune to the Lucas critique. 
However, although there was a move towards developing simpler, theoretically coherent 
models, large-scale Keynesian models such as the FMP were never abandoned completely. 
Small, highly aggregated models, even if they embodied rigorous theory and rational 
expectations, could neither provide the policy analysis needed by the Fed and other 
organizations, nor the predictions and scenarios for which businessmen were willing to pay 
(Webb 1999). The FMP model was kept going until 1995, during which time it was not 
merely maintained but it was developed. It had initially contained around 65-70 behavioral 
 
39 There is insufficient evidence conclusively to identify Adams. It would seem most likely to be F. Gerard 
Adams, who worked on the Wharton model (Bodkin, Klein and Marwah 1991, p. 127 and passim). However, 
the 1970 American Economic Association membership directory also lists a Robert W. Adams whose 1951 PhD 
dissertation, supervised by Paul Samuelson, was on forecasting. 
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equations, but by 1985 the number of such equations had grown to 124 and there were 197 
exogenous variables (Rasche and Shapiro 1968, 123; Brayton and Mauskopf 1985, 170). The 
model might be inconsistent and need continual revision, and its results might need 
continually to be checked against other models and other types of evidence, but it was 
considered indispensable for macroeconomic policy analysis by enough people to justify this 
work (Brayton, Laubach and Reifschneider, 2014). It was eventually replaced by a model that 
allowed the Federal Reserve Board to choose between a menu of expectations equations, 
showing that, at least in one central bank, Lucasian types of modeling did not replace 
Keynesian ones, but were treated as additions to the available toolbox. 
 
Lucas and his followers might criticize Keynesian macroeconometric modeling for its 
lack of theoretical consistency but theoretical consistency could be achieved only at the price 
of ignoring many of the demands that caused Keynesian economists to adopt the methods 
they did. The messiness of the mode may or may not have been a fatal flaw, as Lucas 
claimed, but it was the result of economists engaging in a large-scale scientific project that 
posed technical and organizational problems that needed to be solved. Maintaining a variety 
of sub-models within the projects, taking blocks of equations in and out for simulations, 
fudging intercepts, adding new constraints or behavioral equations that were not micro-
founded was a conscious strategy to yield better predictions and useful conditional forecasts 
and policy analysis. Where critics saw messiness, macroeconometric modelers saw 
flexibility, a characteristic of models which is increasingly being advocated in post-crisis 
macroeconomics. In 2017, in advocating the development of specific models for “policy 
analysis,” Vitor Constancio (2017), Vice-president of the European Central Bank, noted that 
“we constantly update our beliefs on the key economic mechanisms that are necessary to fit 
the data,” concluding that “the model should be reasonably flexible.” Olivier Blanchard 
(2018, 51) likewise argued that theory models and policy models should be developed 
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separately: “policy modelers should accept the fact that equations that truly fit the data can 
have only a loose theoretical justification.” In a surprising turn, he acknowledged that “in 
that, the early macroeconomic models had it right: the permanent income theory, the life-
cycle theory, and the Q theory provided guidance for the specification of consumption and 
investment behaviour, but the data then determined the final specification.” Simon Wren-
Lewis (2018) has even argued that, had traditional structural econometric models, such as the 
ones analyzed here, been maintained alongside models with more rigorous microfoundations, 
economists would have been in a better position to respond to the challenges posed by the 
Great Recession. The revival of such attitudes does not mean that the FMP modelers and their 
contemporaries were correct, but it does suggest that we should make a serious attempt to 
take seriously their motivations and the rationale they saw for the methods they employed. 
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